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States for a possible end to its trade embargo
with Japan while simultaneously preparing
the nation for war. "If Japan's hundred millions merge and go forward," he declared,
"wars can be won with ease." When it
became apparent that U.S. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt would not rescind his demand
for a Japanese evacuation of China, Tojo
authorized the navy to ,attack U.S. military
installations in Pearl Harbor, the Philippines,
and elsewhere in December 1941.
The initial phase of World War II in the
Pacific was characterized by a lightning
series of Japanese victories over British and
U.S. forces. These successes boosted Tojo's
prestige at home and led to greater acceptance of his views on the legitimacy of
force. By June 1942, however, the U.S. victory at the Battle of Midway had stopped
Japanese expansion in its tracks and commenced a long string of heavy defeats. By
1943, Tojo had assumed the additional post
of Military Procurement Minister, and the
following year, he became Chief of the General Staff. When the fall of Saipan in
July 1944 placed Japan in the range of U.S.
bombers, however, Prince Konoe arranged
for Tojo's dismissal as Prime Minister.
When Allied authorities came to his residence with an arrest warrant, Tojo tried and
failed to kill himself. Upon recovering, he
was put on trial by an international war tribunal for crimes against humanity and was
sentenced to death. He accepted all responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities to
absolve the emperor of any blame. He was
subsequently hanged on December 23, 1948.
John C. Fredriksen
See also: February 26 Incident; International
Military Tribunal for the Far East; Ishiwara
Kanji; Konoe Fumimaro; Kwantung Army
Adventurism; ShOwa Emperor (Hirohito); Tripartite Pact; World War II, Pacific Theater.
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Tokugawa Bakufu Political

System
The Tokugawa bakufu political system
represented a mixture of pre-Tokugawa shogunal institutions and innovations implemented by the early Tokugawa shogun.
Hereditary daimyo continued to rule over
semi-autonomous domains, relying on their
own lands for resources, and supported by
samurai loyal only to them. The shogunate
established a general set of rules for maintaining tenuous control over the daimyo,
but relied upon daimyo cooperation to maintain domestic stability and even international relations-for example, by asking
daimyo to engage with the Ryukyu Kingdom, Korea, and the Ezo lands to the north.
The Tokugawa shOgunate devoted its attention to a centered, but not centralized, rule
over Japan. Much of its administration was
focused in Edo and, to a lesser extent, the
surrounding Kanto region, with offices in
key cities such as Osaka, Kyoto, and Nagasaki. In many ways, however, the Tokugawa
shogunate mirrored the domains. For example, it depended on its own lands-nearly
one-fourth of all land in Japan-for economic resources. Likewise, it created similar
recruitment and promotion structures for its
own samurai.
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Of the nearly 22,500 Tokugawa samurai,
nearly 17,000 worked within the shOgunate's bureaucracy. Many of these samurai
received little compensation and were generally underemployed; some even struck
out on their own as ronin, finding various
odd jobs where they could. Managing these
lower-ranked samurai, often called "housemen" (gokenin), was a constant struggle for
the shogunate. The regime wanted housemen to use their time constructively-for
example, by maintaining preparation for
possible military activity. Some acted as
intendents who managed the Tokugawa
lands located throughout the Kanto plain
that surrounded Edo. Others worked as
minor functionaries in the various magistrate offices. The rest of the Tokugawa
liege vassals, known as the "bannermen"
(hatamoto), ranged in rank and income
from 500 to 9,500 koku, a rank just below
daimyo. Although many were indistinguishable from housemen, bannermen could
theoretically claim special privileges-for
example, having an audience with the
shogun. Bannermen staffed the mid-level
bureaucratic positions: the Edo city magistrate, commissioners of finance and foreign
relations, and inspectors. Each position
brought with it financial benefits on top of
their hereditary stipends. More importantly,
these roles gave ambitious vassals a chance
to affect Tokugawa policy. A small percentage of bannermen also managed fiefs, similar to daimyo domains, from which they
could draw material and human resources.
Above the liege vassal samurai were the
vassal daimyo (judai), whose putatively
close connection to the Tokugawa progenitor,
Ieyasu, made them trustworthy for protecting
the Tokugawa realm. This group also staffed
the higher posts, such as the Keeper of
Osaka Castle, the Kyoto Deputy, Master
of Court Ceremony, and the Magistrate of

Temples and Shrines. More importantly,
they filled the highest positions, acting as
the junior and senior councilors who set
Tokugawa policy. Although the title "Great
Councilor" (tairo) existed, it was largely
titular, except when it was occupied by Ii
Naosuke. None of the previously described
positions were permanent, and mechanisms
were in place to break political impasses,
such as the ability to create ad hoc committees, create new magistrate offices, or assign
trusted men to concurrent positions. Some
office-holding daimyo were essentially glorified bannermen: they might have small fiefs,
but lacked the castle stronghold that defined
the classic image of a daimyo. Instead, they
spent most of their time in Edo focused on
their shogunate duties.
Many of the roughly 23 Tokugawa-relative
daimyo (shimpan) were, like the outer
daimyo (tozama), shut out from formal shogunate positions. Nevertheless, the "Three
Houses" (sanke) were important because
they provided a pool of heirs should the shogun fail to produce one. Moreover, the smallest of the three, the Mito domain, maintained
a hereditary role, by custom, as adviser to the
shOgun. Although close to the Tokugawa legacy, the proximity of these domains did not
lead to simple acquiescence to the shogunate. In Mito's case, the early 19th-century
daimyo, Tokugawa Nariaki, criticized the
Tokugawa shOgunate for not "expelling the
barbarians" from Japan.
Several informal channels existed within
the shOgunate that allowed outsiders to gain
at least a minority voice. Daimyo, regardless
of their status, as well as noble families
in Kyoto could influence the shOgun and
shOgunal politics through their "women of
the great interior" (Ooku)-hundreds of
women who served the shogun and managed
his domestic needs. Thus they played an
important function in the political cliques

